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Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions:
State or Federal Responsibility?
The National Emission Standards Act1 directs the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare (HEW) to prescribe standards for emissions from new
motor vehicles and engines. 2 Section 208 of the Act3 clearly indicates the
intent of Congress that the standards issued by the Secretary were to be the
sole and exclusive controls on new automobile emissions. Section 208(a)
provides:
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or at-
tempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject
to this subchapter. No State shall require certification, inspection,
or any other approval relating to the control of emissions from
any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition
precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration
of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.
4
Section 208 is expressly limited to new motor vehicles. A new motor vehicle
is defined as "a motor vehicle the equitable or legal title to which has never
been transferred to an ultimate purchaser." 5  An "ultimate purchaser" is
then defined as the "first person who . . . purchases such new motor ve-
hicle . . . for purposes other than resale."6  Thus, once an automobile is
sold to an ultimate purchaser and registered by a state, legally it becomes a
used car and is no longer exclusively subject to federal control under Section
208. The Act, therefore, does not purport to establish standards which
would interfere with intrastate operations but regulates only interstate activi-
ties.
The National Emission Standards Act, like other federal pollution control
legislation, 7 is based constitutionally on the powers granted to Congress by
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857f-1-18571 (Supp. V, 1970) (enacted as Title II of the Air
Quality Act of 1967).
2. Id. § 1857f-1.
3. Id. § 1857f-6(a).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 1857f-7(3).
6. Id. § 1857f-7(5).
7. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-81, as amended (Supp. V, 1970); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-94, as amended (Supp. V, 1970).
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the commerce clause.8 Although Congress has often exercised police powers
through the commerce clause, 9 the language of Section 208 presents an
unusual move by Congress to preempt by legislation state activities in an
entire area regardless of whether the federal government has in reality occu-
pied that area. This article, therefore, will discuss the effect Section 208
has on efforts to abate motor vehicular pollution and will examine the al-
ternate avenues remaining which the states can pursue to control automo-
bile emissions.
To place these issues in proper perspective, a threefold analysis based on
the development of federal programs in the field of motor vehicle emission
control will be employed to determine: (1) whether the states would have
the basic authority to control automobile emissions in the absence of any
federal action; (2) whether the states could act concurrently with the federal
government; and (3) whether through congressional action state programs
could and should be completely supplanted.
State and Federal Authority to Act
Interstate commerce, which is subject to congressional regulation, includes all
movement of persons or things across state lines whether for profit or not.10
The fact, therefore, that automobiles are normally operated in more than
one state as well as sold in interstate commerce makes them potential sub-
jects of congressional controls. The emissions from automobiles are likewise
subject to the power granted to Congress by the commerce clause since the
movement of air "pollutants across state lines constitutes interstate com-
merce." 1 l
For a general discussion of these particular pollution control acts and their relation to
the commerce clause, see Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application
of the Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEo.
WAsH. L. REV. 1067 (1965).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. See, e.g., Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
51 (Supp. V, 1970); Boiler Inspection Acts, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1964); Natural Gas
Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-96 (Supp. V, 1970); National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391-1409, 1421-25 (Supp.
V, 1970); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-68 (Supp. V, 1970).
10. See Pennslyvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421,
431 (1855). In a later case the Supreme Court stated: "Commerce with foreign
countries and among the states, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic,
including in these terms navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and
property, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities." County of Mo-
bile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 702 (1880). See also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 172 (1941); United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 423-24 (1919).
11. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624, 629 (1968), afI'd,
423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970). The Bishop decision repre-
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"The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by con-
stant and serious dangers to the public .... ,,12 One of those "serious dan-
gers is air pollution from motor vehicle emissions which account for over 60
percent of all air pollution in the United States.1 3  Although the states may
exercise their police powers to protect the health, safety, and comfort of
their citizens, "[tlhe reasonableness of the State's action is always subject to
inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and . . .is likewise sub-
ordinate to the will of Congress."'1 4 One of the qualifications the Constitution
places on the states' right to protect their citizenry is that they cannot control
those matters which "admit only of one uniform system, [or] plan of regula-
tion."' 5 However, where "local necessities" require varying regulation, the
states share the power to regulate with the federal government. 16 Air pollu-
tion problems differ markedly from one area to another because of varying
meteorological and geographical conditions, sources of pollution emissions,
and social and governmental factors. Consequently, such problems require
local solutions.' 7
The Supreme Court has held that "in the absence of the exercise of federal
authority, and in the light of local exigencies, the State is free to act in order
to protect its legitimate interests even though interstate commerce is directly
affected"' and in certain cases, state actions may legitimately amount to a
material interference with interstate commerce.' 9 The states have the basic
sents the first significant federal court interpretation of the Air Quality Act of 1967.
Although dealing specifically with air pollution from stationary manufacturing processes,
this decision would likewise be so interpreted concerning automobile emissions.
12. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915). See also Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE AUTOMOBILE & AIR POLLUTION: A PROGRAM
FOR PROGRESS, PART I, at 10, 11 (1967). Motor vehicles account for about 91 percent
of all carbon monoxide, 63 percent of the unburned hydrocarbons, 48 percent of
oxides of nitrogen, eight percent of the particulates and four percent of sulphur oxides.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., THE SEARCH FOR A
Low-EMISSION VEHICLE 2 n.12 (1969). Carbon monoxide combines with hemoglobin
in the blood and displaces oxygen causing impairment of psychomotor performance.
Hydrocarbons interact with oxides of nitrogen in sunlight producing smog, eye irrita-
tion, and damage to vegetation. Oxides of nitrogen contribute to photochemical reac-
tions and cause pulmonary damage. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE AUTOMOBILE &
AIR POLLUTION: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS, PART II, at 2-5 (1967).
14. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622-23 (1915).
15. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
16. Id.
17. FIRST REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PROG-
RESS IN THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF Am POLLUTION, S. Doc. No. 92, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-7 (1968).
18. Eichholz v. Commission, 306 U.S. 268, 274 (1938), citing Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
19. "Where traffic control and the use of highways are involved and where there is
no conflicting federal regulation, great leeway is allowed local authorities, even though
the local regulation materially interferes with interstate commerce." Railway Express
1970]
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authority to enact legislation to control motor vehicle emissions in the absence
of federal action even though such legislation would have some effect on
cars traveling in interstate commerce. State regulations, however, would
have to be limited to only cars sold or registered in the state since an attempt
to control the emissions of all motor vehicles operated in the state would
constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 20
Prior to 1965, the federal government had taken no action to control motor
vehicle emissions. 21 If action was to be taken in this area it was up to the
states, but only one state, California, had authorized motor vehicle emission
standards. 22 In 1965, a second title was added to the Clean Air Act of 1963
directing the Secretary of HEW to establish emission standards for new
motor vehicles. 23  The statute made no mention of whether the federal ac-
tion was to preempt or supplement the actions of states in the area of
automobile emission control. The intent of Congress appears to have been
that national standards were preferred to the exclusion of state controls be-
cause "[t]he high rate of mobility of automobiles suggests that anything
short of nationwide control would scarcely be adequate to cope with the
motor vehicle pollution problem."' 24  Pursuant to the 1965 Act, regulations
were established on March 30, 1966 for crankcase and exhaust emissions
for 1968 model year cars. 25 After considering technological feasibility and
economic costs, as required by the Act, 26 standards were prescribed for only
hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions. 27
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949). See also Atchison T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346, 355 (1954); Buck v. California, 343
U.S. 99 (1952).
20. In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), state regulations
requiring special mudflaps for vehicles on state highways that differed from those au-
thorized in other states were held invalid as an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.
21. The basic air pollution control statute in effect in 1965 was the Clean Air Act
of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 1857, as amended (Supp. V, 1970), which was concerned only
with general air quality, not sources of pollution.
22. California adopted its Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act in 1960. Ch. 23,
§ I (1961) Cal. Stats. 346. That Act was repealed in 1967 by the Mulford-Carrell
Air Resources Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-39570 (West Supp. 1967),
which authorized more extensive motor vehicle emission controls. For a detailed
discussion of California's motor vehicle pollution control legislation see Kennedy &
Weekes, Control of Automobile Emissions--California Experience and the Federal
Legislation, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 297 (1968).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (Supp. V, 1970).
24. H.R. REP. No. 899, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
25. 45 C.F.R. Part 85 (1970).
26. "The Secretary shall by regulation, giving appropriate consideration to tech-
nological feasibility and economic costs, prescribe ... standards, applicable to the
emission of any kind of substance, from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines. ... 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
27. For a more complete list of the components of automobile emissions and their
effect, see note 13, supra.
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While the abatement of air pollution caused by motor vehicles is a legiti-
mate area in which the states may act, such state action cannot prevent
Congress from exercising its constitutional powers. For Congress to regu-
late commerce "among the states" its power "must be exercised within the
territorial jurisdiction of the several states."' 28  Under the necessary and
proper clause 29 Congress can interfere with exclusively intrastate activities
to carry out its general powers,3 0 and can act even though the matter acted
upon is the proper subject of a state's police power.
31
Regardless of the action by Congress providing for establishment of
national emission standards for automobiles, the states were not automatically
foreclosed from pursuing their own standards, although the enactment raised
the question of preemption. Normally, federal preemption is upheld if there
is evidence that concurrent jurisdiction within the state would interfere with a
federal program. 32 However, the only way a state program could actually
conflict with federal motor vehicle emission standards would be for the state
to require that less stringent controls be met. However, this would be com-
pletely unrealistic since such controls would increase rather than abate air
pollution. Congressional enactments are not held to preempt state statutes
designed to protect public health and safety unless the intent to do so is clearly
indicated.3 3 Although Congress clearly favored national motor vehicle emis-
sion standards, the legislative history of the 1965 Act is vague on the subject
of whether such standards were to be exclusive.
34
Between 1965 and 1967 the question of preemption in the area of auto-
mobile emission standards was never litigated. Any question that existed
because of the 1965 Act was resolved by Congress with the enactment in
1967 of the National Emission Standards Act s1 which contained the Section
28. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
30. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
31. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919). "It is no
objection to the exercise of the power of Congress that it is attended by the same inci-
dents which attend the exercise of the police power of a State." FPC v. Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575, 582 (1941).
32. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
33. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago R.I. & R.R., 382 U.S. 423
(1966); Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 253 (1948); Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945). "[I]t is well-settled that where the state's police power is involved, preemp-
tion will not be presumed." Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 511 (2d Cir.
1969), quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 324 n.8 (lst Cir. 1969).
34. The 1965 Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act "contains no explicit state-
ments concerning the preemption of state laws on this subject, and no statements
concerning this problem were made on either the House or Senate floor when the bill
was debated." H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857f-1-1857l (Supp. V, 1970).
19701
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208 preemption provision. A carefully worded exception to Section 208
permitted only California to apply for a waiver.3 6 This waiver would permit
California to issue its own standards, consistent with national regulations,
after showing that "extraordinary conditions" compelled adoption of more
stringent standards.
The argument has been set forth that the preemption provided for in Sec-
tion 208 is not absolute in that states might have the authority to regulate
emissions for which no federal standard has been established.8 7 This argu-
ment is based on the contention that "neither Congress nor the HEW Secre-
tary desired a total absence of standards governing these pollutants; they
desired merely to prevent the duplication of federal standards by state stand-
ards."'3 8 This position ignores the fact that federal preemption was intended
to prevent the promulgation of state standards which would conflict with
36. The Secretary shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive
application of this section to any state which has adopted standards (other
than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless
he finds that such State does not require standards more stringent than ap-
plicable Federal standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions
or that such State standards. and accompanying enforcement procedures are
not consistent with Section 202(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(a) (Supp. V, 1970). Section 202(a) of the Act, provides:
The Secretary shall by regulation, giving appropriate consideration to tech-
nological feasibility and economic costs, prescribe as soon as practicable
standards, applicable to the emission of any kind of substance, from any class
or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his
judgment cause or contribute to, or are likely to cause or to contribute to, air
pollution which endangers the health or welfare of any persons, and such
standards shall apply to such vehicles or engines whether they are designed as
complete systems or incorporate other devices to prevent or control such
pollution.
Id. § 1857f-l(a).
The Colorado legislature agreed to S.J. Res. 26 on March 10, 1970, which cited
"extraordinary circumstances" and requested that the Secretary of HEW waive the pre-
emption provision with regard to the state. The Resolution merely ignored the fact
that Colorado did not have state standards other than for crankcase emission prior
to March 30, 1966, which is necessary to qualify for a waiver. The Colorado request
was denied by the Secretary of HEW in a letter to the Secretary of the Colorado
Senate dated June 11, 1970.
Crankcase emissions are those gases which escape from the cylinder between the
sealing surfaces of the piston and cylinder wall into the crankcase. They account for
about 25 percent of the hydrocarbon emissions from uncontrolled automobiles. THE
AUTOMOBILE & AIR POLLUTION, PART II, supra note 13, at 30. The requirement that
states have enacted before March 30, 1966, emission standards other than for crankcase
emissions was included in the preemption provision because regulations covering crank-
case emissions have been in general use throughout the country since 1963. S. REP.
No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967).
37. Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption,
68 MicH. L. REV. 1083, 1096-97 (1970).
38. Id. at 1096.
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each other as well as with the federal standards.39 Since the Secretary of
HEW is directed to give "appropriate consideration to technological feasibility
and economic costs"' 40 in prescribing standards, he does desire a "total ab-
sence of standards" until technical and economic problems can be over-
come.41 There is nothing in the legislative history of the National Emission
Standards Act which indicates anything other than the intent of Congress to
preempt all state activities relating to the emissions of new motor vehicles.
42
The action of Congress was conclusive with regard to the question of
preemption since federal enactments will supersede laws enacted under a
state's police power when there is a conflict between valid state and federal
statutes.43 In United States v. Bishop Processing Co.44 a rendering plant in
Maryland which was releasing obnoxious odors into Delaware contended
that Congress was without the authority to enact the Air Quality Act of 1967
regulating air pollution. The district court determined that judicial review
of the congressional finding that air pollution affects commerce is limited
to the questions of "whether Congress had a rational basis" for such finding,
"and if it had such a basis, whether the means selected to eliminate the evil
are reasonable and appropriate. '45 The decision in Bishop held that Con-
gress had a rational basis for finding that air pollution affects commerce be-
cause: (1) malodorous pollution, even though invisible, affects business
conditions and clearly interferes with interstate commerce, and (2) Congress
39. "[I]t would be more desirable to have national standards rather than for each
state to have a variation in standards and requirements which could result in chaos in
so far as manufacturers, dealers, and users are concerned." H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967), quoting H.R. REP. No. 899, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1965).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (Supp. V, 1970). See note 36, supra.
41. "More effective standards can be established only as the technology is de-
veloped to adequately cope with automotive emissions." FIRST REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PROGRESS IN THE PREVENTION AND CON-
TROL OF AIR POLLUTION, S. Doc. No. 92, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1967).
42. The "legislative history" of a statute consists of the official committee reports
accompanying the act along with that debate on the floor of the House and Senate
which is necessary to aid in the construction or interpretation of the act. It does not
include statements made at hearings where anyone may testify and say anything con-
cerning the particular subject under consideration. But see Currie, supra note 37, at
1096-97.
43. "The United States is asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce ...
There is no question that this power is superior to that of the states to provide for the
welfare and necessities of their inhabitants." Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266
U.S. 405, 425, 426 (1924). See also Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Bd., 340 U.S. 383
(1951); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1944);
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
44. 287 F. Supp. 624 (1968), ajl'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
904 (1970).
45. Id. at 630-31.
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has the power to regulate all interstate activities, no matter how insignifi-
cant.
46
The Questionable Federal Role
Congress has always recognized the varying nature of air pollution problems
and the need for state cooperation to combat them. Although the federal role
in pollution control programs has continually increased, there has always been
a reliance on state action except in the area of motor vehicle emission control.
The "Findings" of the Clean Air Act of 196347 stated that "the prevention
and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States
and local governments." '48 Identical language was used in the "Findings" of
the Air Quality Act of 196749 which contained the National Emission Stand-
ards Act and the preemptive Section 208.
In both air and water pollution abatement programs provision is made
for the states to develop standards and submit them to the federal government
for approval.50 Only if the states fail to act or if their action is inadequate
can the federal government promulgate its own standards. Such state
participation was not provided for in the development of automobile emis-
sion standards. The decision by Congress to preempt state activities in the
area of automobile emissions was prompted by the fear that the development
of numerous conflicting state standards might be an unreasonable burden
on motor vehicle manufacturers. 5' Such fears were justified since at the time
the preemption provision was being considered by Congress in 1967, eighteen
states had legislation pending which would have authorized regulation of
motor vehicle emissions.
52
Although the enactment of Section 208 foreclosed the possibility of con-
flicting or burdensome state standards, it was inconsistent with the declared
intent of Congress to cooperate with and encourage the states in the de-
velopment of pollution abatement programs. Similarly, Section 208 was
not responsive to the charge that air pollution is a local problem which
46. Id. at 632.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
48. Id. § 1857(a)(3) (1964).
49. Id. § 1857(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1970).
50. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (1964); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
51. S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967).
52. These eighteen states were: Arizona, California (which already had emission
standards in effect), Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Hearings on Problems and Progress Associated with
Control of Automobile Exhaust Emissions Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at
395-99 (1967).
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varies from place to place and requires tailored, not blanket, solutions. The
Senate Public Works Committee, which added the preemption provision to
the National Emission Standards Act,53 admitted that "[o]ther regions of the
Nation may develop air pollution situations related to automobile emissions
which will require standards different from those applicable nationally.
54
Nevertheless, the Committee was content to make the preemption section
absolute and limit the right to apply for a waiver to only California thereby
requiring that any change be made through the cumbersome legislative proc-
ess and subjected to political considerations.
The action of Congress in controlling motor vehicle emissions becomes
even more curious when compared with the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.,1 That Act directs the Secretary of Trans-
portation to establish federal motor vehicle safety standards.5 It forbids
the states to establish "with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor
vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical
to the Federal standard. '5 7 States, therefore, may establish requirements for
pieces of equipment for which there is no federal standard or for a different
aspect of a piece of equipment for which there is a federal standard.58  This
stands in stark contrast to the policy set out in the National Emission Stand-
ards Act which prohibits state action regardless of whether or not the Sec-
retary of HEW has acted.
The model State Air Pollution Control Act59 developed by the Council
of State Governments contains a provision60 which would be the state counter-
part of a federal position such as that provided in the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The model code does not limit state automobile
emission standards to used cars but would prevent the states from promulgat-
ing standards for equipment or features already covered by federal standards.
A basic distinction can be drawn, however, between the adoption and en-
forcement of nationwide safety standards and uniform emission regulations.
53. The bill proposed by the Johnson administration, which eventually became the
1967 Air Quality Act, contained no preemption provision. S. 780, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
54. S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391-1409, 1421-25 (Supp. V, 1970).
56. Id. § 1392(a).
57. Id. § 1392(d).
58. This limited and narrow construction of the preemption provision of the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act has been upheld by the Second Circuit in
Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969).
59. COUNCIL ON STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, STATE AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT (1967).
60. Id. § 16(a).
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It is extremely difficult to devise testing procedures which can be used to
determine whether a particular vehicle has an acceptable level of emis-
sions. The level of emissions varies as the car is operated under different
conditions while safety appliances such as seatbelts, headrests, padded in-
teriors, and collapsible steering columns remain constant at all times. The
actual emission standards which list the permissible amounts of pollutants
are meaningless unless proper test procedures can be devised to detect what
levels actually exist.61
The difficulties encountered in accurately testing motor vehicles have
been compounded by a provision in the 1967 National Emission Standards
Act which permits the testing of only prototype engines and vehicles.6 2 Such
samples are submitted by the manufacturer and there is no guarantee that the
vehicles actually produced for sale will conform to the standards met by the
finely tuned prototype. 6' Legislation which has been passed by the House
of Representatives and the Senate would correct that defect by requiring
testing of cars on the assembly lines.64
The importance of the testing procedures is evidenced by the fact that in
1966 when the original emissions standards were published in the Federal
61. For a detailed discussion of the role testing procedures play in the enforcement
of motor vehicle emission standards, see Hearings on Air Pollution Control and
Solid Waste Recycling Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at
308-12 (1970) (testimony of Dr. John T. Middleton, Commissioner, National Air
Pollution Control Administration).
62. (a) Upon application of the manufacturer, the Secretary shall test, or
require to be tested, in such manner as he deems appropriate, any new motor
vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted by such manufacturer to deter-
mine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations under sec-
tion 1857f-I of this title. If such vehicle or engine conforms to such regula-
tions the Secretary shall issue a certificate of conformity, upon such terms,
and for such period not less than one year, as he may prescribe.
(b) Any new motor vehicle or any motor vehicle engine sold by such
manufacturer which is in all material respects substantially the same construc-
tion as the test vehicle or engine for which a certificate has been issued under
subsection (a) of this section, shall for the purposes of this chapter be
deemed to be in conformity with the regulations issued under section 1857f-1
of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-5 (Supp. V, 1970). For a detailed discussion of the interpreta-
tion of this section by HEW, see Hearings on S.3229, S.3466, S.3546 Before the Sub-
comm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 167-69 (1970).
63. See Hearings on Air Pollution Control and Solid Waste Recycling, supra note
61, at 309.
64. H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Different versions of H.R. 17,255
have passed the House and the Senate. Section 206 of the House-passed bill, and
Section 207 of the bill passed by the Senate, provide for testing of individual cars. See
note 76, infra.
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Register,65 the actual standards for emissions occupied Y6 page of a nine page
rule, while the other 8% pages were devoted to testing procedures. A
further illustration of the role testing procedures play is the announcement
by the National Air Pollution Control Administration that 1970 model year
cars which were thought to be meeting the appropriate standards were found
actually to be entirely inadequate when more accurate test procedures were
employed.66 Consequently, the more accurate procedures have been put
forth as proposed rules in the hope that 1972 cars will conform with stand-
ards intended for 1970 automobiles. 7
If the states are given a role in controlling motor vehicle emissions, consid-
eration must be given to the testing procedures as well as the actual standards.
A heavy burden could be placed on automobile manufacturers if they were
required to test their cars in accordance with varying test procedures to con-
form with varying standards. At the same time, the fact that the federal
test procedures were in effect for two years before it was determined that
they were inadequate and corrective action was taken does not lend support
to the contention that the federal government is capable of controlling emis-
sions for the states.
The inclusion in the National Emission Standards Act of a provision sim-
ilar to that in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act would be
responsive to some of the criticism of action taken under the Emission Act.68
To date no federal standards have been promulgated for emissions of nitrogen
oxides which are the chief element in the photochemical smog which plagues
so many cities. 69 With existing technology the control of nitrogen oxides
is inconsistent with the control of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide7 ° and
no federal standards for nitrogen oxide emissions will be promulgated until
1973. 71 In the meantime, California, the only state allowed to promulgate
65. 31 Fed. Reg. 5170 (1966). These regulations are codified in Part 85 of 45
C.F.R. (1970).
66. The announcement was made July 14, 1970, at a press conference held by Dr.
John T. Middleton, Commissioner, National Air Pollution Control Administration.
See Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1970, at 2, col. 4.
67. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,336 (1970).
68. See letter from Richard B. Ogilvie, Governor of Illinois, to Representative Ab-
ner Mikva, 116 CONG. REC. H5377 (daily ed. June 10, 1970).
69. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., THE SEARCH
FOR A Low-EMISSION VEHICLE 6-7 (1970).
70. Carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons are generated by incomplete combustion of
fuel in the automobile engine while nitrogen oxides result from high temperatures as-
sociated with more thorough combustion. A reduction in the level of one normally
means an increase in the other. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE AUTOMOBILE
& AIR POLLUTION: A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS. PART II, at 20 (1967).
71. 35 Fed. Reg. 2791 (1970).
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its own standards, has had limits on nitrogen oxides 72 while other states are
prevented from acting by Section 208.
Legislation has been introduced in the 91st Congress to repeal Section
208. 73 Although no action has been taken on that particular legislation, an un-
successful attempt was made on the floor of the House of Representatives74
to attach an amendment repealing the preemption to the pending 1970 Clean
Air Act Amendments.75 However, the Senate has passed a separate version
of the same bill entitled the "National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970."76
Section 210 of that bill authorizes every state to promulgate its own emission
standards for new automobiles "where such State demonstrates, after public
hearings, to the satisfaction of the Secretary [of HEW] that more restrictive
emission standards for vehicles or engines are required to implement national




Even though Congress has decided to prevent states from regulating new
motor vehicles, there are two major areas in which states can act to reduce
automobile emissions. First, the National Emission Standards Act permits,
and its legislative history encourages, states to enact regulations for automo-
biles produced prior to 1968.78 These uncontrolled cars are responsible for
a significant amount of automotive air pollution. 79 Such state controls
would not be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act which seeks to prevent
the imposition of harsh burdens on automobile manufacturers. Used cars
72. For a resume of California motor vehicle emission standards, see THIRD REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PROGRESS IN THE PREVEN-
TION AND CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION, S. Doc. No. 64, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970).
73. H.R. 16,013, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
74. 116 CONG. REC. H5375-81 (daily ed. June 10, 1970).
75. H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
76. Id. This bill has been sent to a conference committee to resolve the differences
between the House and Senate versions.
77. Id. § 210.
78. Section 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (Supp. V, 1970), of the National Emis-
sion Standards Act specifically provides that the Secretary of HEW can regulate only
"new" motor vehicles. The Senate Report on the Act, S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967), states that "any significant advance in control of used vehicles would
result in a corresponding reduction in air pollution .... [This is an area] in which
the States and local governments can be most effective." Id. at 34.
79. In 1967, the last year new motor vehicles were not subject to federal regula-
tions, over 96,000 cars were registered in the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 548 (1969).
Since 1968, new cars have been produced at the rate of about 10,000,000 per year,
Hearings on Air Pollution Control and Solid Waste Recycling, supra note 61, at 308.
For a comparison of the exhaust emissions of unregulated and regulated cars, see U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE AUTOMOBILE & AIR POLLUTION, PART I, at 20 (1967).
[Vol. 20:157
Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions
are no longer the manufacturer's responsibility and since there are no federal
standards for these cars, there is nothing with which state standards could
conflict. Second, the Act also allocates to the states the vital role of insuring
that automobile pollution control devices are effectively maintained.80 In
fact, the Act provides for federal financial assistance to the states to aid in
the development of "meaningful motor vehicle testing programs." 1  Since
the states have failed to assume this responsibility, the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments which have been passed by the House of Representatives
2
authorize the Secretary of HEW to require states to implement automobile
inspection programs if this is deemed necessary in order to conform to na-
tional air quality standards.8 3 In inspecting vehicles the states presumably
can require that the vehicles conform to any standard the state establishes
8 4
since technically only used cars, which the states have the authority to regu-
late,15 will be inspected.
Even with Section 208 in force, states may be able to surmount its re-
strictions. The definition in the Act of a new motor vehicle86 may permit
the indirect regulation of new vehicles by technically classifying them as
used vehicles immediately after titling by the ultimate purchaser. Citing
Cloverleaf v. Patterson7 as precedent, Mr. Sidney Edelman, Office of the
General Counsel of the Department of HEW, testified before the Senate
Public Works Committee 8 that a state legitimately could prohibit the oper-
ation of an automobile within that state which did not meet the state stand-
ards but did conform with federal requirements. Although his comments
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6b (Supp. V, 1970). The House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee pointed out that under the Act the states' responsibility would
be to "assume responsibility for inspection of pollution control systems as an integral
part of safety inspection programs." H.R. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
35 (1967).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6b (Supp. V, 1970).
82. H.R. 17,255 § 4(a)(1), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
83. Since the states presently have the authority to regulate used cars and inspect
all automobiles, they are not powerless to control motor vehicle emissions in conjunc-
tion with meeting ambient air quality standards promulgated pursuant to the Air Quality
Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c) (Supp. V, 1970). But see Currie, Motor Vehicle
Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1083, 1087
& n.21 (1970).
84. It has been argued that states could only inspect to insure compliance with
federal standards. Id. at 1093-94.
85. See notes 5, 6 and accompanying text supra.
86. Id.
87. 315 U.S. 148, 162 (1951). The Court held in Cloverleaf that even though "the
entire process of manufacture [of renovated butter] is subject to federal supervision
...the power of the States over the subject of the manufacture and sale of process
and renovated butter within their respective limits was to be unrestricted ..... Id.
at 154, 162.
88. Hearings on Problems and Progress Associated with Control of Automobile Ex-
hust Emissions, supra note 52, at 116.
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concerned federal standards promulgated under the 1965 Act which had
no explicit preemption section, they are nevertheless applicable to the situa-
tion under the 1967 Act since both Mr. Edelman and HEW contended that
the 1965 Act was sufficient to preempt state standards. The emphasis
placed on the states' authority to regulate automobiles which have been
transferred to the ultimate purchaser, along with the fact that Congress
itself drew the distinct technical line between new and used vehicles, would
apparently offset the argument that state control based on the technical
classification of a car as "used" would be prohibited on the basis that a




Congress was acting within its constitutional authority in preventing the
states from adopting or enforcing standards for motor vehicle emissions.
Such action, however, is not consistent with the existing allocation of pollu-
tion control activities between the states and the federal government. Serious
questions can be raised as to whether the program authorized by Congress is
the most effective means of combating air pollution caused by motor ve-
hicles. Those reservations are buttressed by the limited and inadequate
actions taken by the Secretary of HEW under the National Emission Stand-
ards Act.
A more effective program might provide for the promulgation of minimum
national standards and test procedures while allowing the states to adopt such
additional standards as are appropriate for local conditions. The state re-
quirements could be submitted to the Secretary of HEW for approval before
becoming effective to insure that they would be consistent with programs in
other states and not inflict an unreasonable burden on automobile manu-
facturers. This would be consistent with the sections providing for state
cooperation in other air and water pollution control programs while allowing
the states to play an effective role in establishing motor vehicle emission
standards without impinging on congressional authority of impairing inter-
state commerce.
S. Allan Adelman
89. But see Kennedy & Weekes, Control of Automobile Emissions-California Ex-
perience and the Federal Legislation, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 297, 313 (1968);
Currie, supra note 83, at 1092.
